When I moved to Washington, D.C., in 2002 all of us lived in 9/11’s shadow. We waited for bombs in the Metro, for extra anthrax envelopes, for a sequel to the earlier autumn’s terror. We watched planes headed for Reagan Airport fly low over the Potomac, all the time half-expecting them to veer.
Everything in my occupation revolved round the War on Terror. And everybody I knew who was even the least bit conservative (a class that included many Democrats) was able to invade Iraq — and doubtless Syria and Iran for good measure.
Everyone besides one school good friend, Elbridge Colby, then newly planted at the State Department. His politics in these days had been “severely conservative” (to borrow a phrase from the political taxonomist Mitt Romney), however he anticipated George W. Bush’s technique to finish in catastrophe. Nightly in our unkempt residences he argued with the hawks — which is to say with all of us — channeling the realist international coverage thinkers he admired, predicting quagmire, destabilization and defeat.
In nearly each approach the remainder of the post-9/11 period vindicated his arguments — not simply in the Iraq struggle but in addition in our chaos-sowing Libya intervention and our failed try at nation-building in Afghanistan.
Still, a model of Bush-era hawkishness survived amongst Republicans not named Rand Paul. Even in 2015, it was nonetheless potent sufficient that Colby was reportedly blackballed from a job as international coverage director for Jeb Bush’s marketing campaign, due to his inadequate enthusiasm a few potential battle with Iran.
A consensus can change slowly after which, underneath the proper stress, abruptly, and for Republicans that stress got here from Donald Trump. No dove or systematizer, he nonetheless made realism and anti-interventionism respectable once more — with fast penalties for my good friend. Two years after Team Jeb! declined his companies, Colby was in Trump’s Pentagon serving to devise the administration’s nationwide protection technique. And now he has a brand new ebook, “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” making the case for a international coverage that leaves the post-9/11 period decisively behind.
As the title suggests, it is a realist’s ebook, laser-focused on China’s bid for mastery in Asia as the 21st century’s most vital menace. All different challenges are secondary: Terrorism could be managed with “smaller footprint operations,” the liberal Trump-era fixation on Vladimir Putin errors a sideshow for the major occasion and the longstanding Republican give attention to rogue states like Iran and North Korea is equally misguided.
Only China threatens American pursuits in a profound approach, by a consolidation of financial energy in Asia that imperils our prosperity and a navy defeat that might shatter our alliance system. Therefore American coverage ought to be organized to disclaim Beijing regional hegemony and deter any navy adventurism — at first by a stronger dedication to defending the island of Taiwan.
“The Strategy of Denial” presents a very unsentimental model of what lots of people bidding to form a post-9/11-era international coverage imagine — and never simply youthful Republicans like Colby. The Biden White House has its share of softer-spoken China hawks, and its disentanglement from Afghanistan and relative dovishness towards Russia each mirror a want to prioritize China coverage greater than, say, a Hillary Clinton administration may need carried out.
But it is a good distance from being any type of consensus. The institution freak-out over Biden’s Afghan withdrawal signifies the extent to which a centered, China-first international coverage looks as if retreat to Democrats and Republicans accustomed to extra world and limitless ambitions.
Meanwhile, a really completely different group of post-9/11-era thinkers regards China hawkishness as a dangerously self-fulfilling prophecy — a method to blunder, like the Bush-era neoconservatives Colby as soon as critiqued, into an pointless and disastrous struggle. Rather than the outdated institution’s maximalism, they like minimalism, an finish even to the light-footprint types of warcraft attacked by Samuel Moyn of Yale in his new ebook “Humane” — an attention-grabbing accompaniment and counterpoint to Colby’s — and a deliberate retreat from empire. (The concept that local weather change requires conciliation with China additionally looms giant for some on this group.)
The minimalist group has the least affect in Washington, however its skepticism about warmaking has a variety of fashionable assist — together with skepticism about struggle with China. Even with Beijing’s elevated belligerence and its Covid cover-ups, a survey in the summer season of 2020 discovered that solely 41 p.c of American favored preventing for Taiwan, a scarcity of enthusiasm confirmed in casual surveys of virtually everybody I do know.
But Beijing’s personal decisions may also form our technique. A China that retreats considerably, post-Covid, from bellicosity and border skirmishes would defang the China-hawk argument fairly a bit.
On the different hand, a China that appears at American disarray and its personal window of alternative and decides to maneuver aggressively may depart my outdated good friend in the similar place the 9/11 period left his youthful self — along with his strategic evaluation vindicated, unhappily, by an American defeat.
The Times is dedicated to publishing a variety of letters to the editor. We’d like to listen to what you concentrate on this or any of our articles. Here are some ideas. And right here’s our e-mail: [email protected]
Follow The New York Times Opinion part on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTOpinion) and Instagram.